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Abstract
Representative democracy does not necessarily eliminate political cor-
ruption. Existing models explain the survival of rent-taking politicians by
ideological divisions in the electorate and/or informational asymmetries.
The current paper demonstrate that rent extraction can persist even if vot-
ers are fully informed and ideologically homogenous.We show that in such
an environment, voters may gain by persistently reelecting a rent-taker that
limits his rent extraction. Such an equilibrium occurs when voters and
politicians do not discount the future too heavily, and the share of honest
candidates is relatively small.
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1 Introduction
In representative democracies voters may condition reelection on the observed
performance of incumbents. Elections allow voters to "throw out the rascals" in
peaceful ways. Arguably this is the dening characteristic of democratic govern-
ment (Hayek 1979:137; Riker 1982; Popper 1989:344; Schumpeter 1942). Over the
past 30 years or so the limitations of this argument have been explored in formal
models of electoral agency.
Rent-takers are permitted to survive elections in agency models for a number
of reasons. With pure moral hazard, rent-taking incumbents survive due to private
information (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986). In models with both moral hazard and
selection (type-uncertainty), rent-takers can survive by copying the behavior of
honest incumbents (Austen-Smith & Banks 1989; Banks & Sundaram 1993; Besley
2006; Fearon 1999; Maskin & Tirole 2004). If voter ideology is added, a majority
of voters may also prefer rent-takers to honest candidates for ideological reasons
(Besley 2006; Polo 1998; Svensson 1997).
Empirically, it is not uncommon for reputed rent-takers to survive elections.
Some even manage to get reelected several times. Sometimes this happens in
ideologically homogenous societies. Consider a few motivating cases. By standard
measures, Argentina, Croatia, Greece and Italy are among the most ideologically
homogenous electoral democracies in the world.1 However, as measured by indexes
1 "Electoral democracy" is dened as in Cheibub et al. (2010). Self placement scores
on the left-right axis from the World Value Surveys return an average standard
deviation of 2.18 over the 1994-2002 period. Comparable numbers for the four
cases: Argentina 1.98; Croatia 1.79; Greece 2.12; and Italy 2.20. Average ethnic,
linguistic and religious fractionalization for all electoral democracies in the WVS
dataset were 0.38; 0.33; and 0.46 respectively. Comparable numbers for the four
cases were Argentina 0.26, 0.06, 0.22; Croatia 0.37, 0.08, 0.44; Greece 0.16, 0.03,
0.15; and Italy 0.11, 0.11, 0.30 (Norris 2009).
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of corruption in public life, they perform poorly.2 In these countries recent political
leaders have survived in o¢ ce for protracted periods of time in the face of elections.
Available evidence indicates that voters knew about the rent taking behavior of
their politicians.
Carlos Menem of the Peronist party entered his second consecutive term as
president of Argentina in the election of 1995. The corrupt nature of the Menem
administration was widely known prior to his reelection. As one commentator puts
it:
"...business informants in Argentina explained to me... that in the 1980s,
under the rst democratic administration of President Alfonsín, it was dif-
cult to know when a bribe was expected, which o¢ cials were or were not
corrupt, or what the appropriate tari¤ might be. In the 1990s, under Pres-
ident Menem and the Peronists, by contrast, there was, according to these
sources, no ambiguity or embarrassment, and the rates and procedures were
clear cut and predictable" (Whitehead 2000:112).
Ivo Sanader became prime minister after leading the Croatian Democratic
Union party (HDZ) to electoral victory in 2003.3 Subsequently, condence in
him was rea¢ rmed in the 2007 election and his premiership continued. The HDZ
- in the rm grip of Franco Tudjman - ruled Croatia from its foundation in 1992,
until electoral defeat in 2000. During this period HDZ built a horrible reputa-
tion for wide ranging and habitual abuses of power, including ethnic cleansing,
war crimes, suppression of the press, economic mismanagement and corruption.
Sanader served under Tudjman in several high positions. His already tarnished
reputation did not improve during his rst term as prime minister, as Sanader
became associated with several widely publicized corruption incidents.4
2 Transparency Internationals average corruption perception index (cpi) for the years
1994 - 2002 (0 to 10 scale; low numbers=corrupt) was 5.0 for all electoral democra-
cies. Comparable scores for the four cases: Argentina 3.0; Croatia 3.5; Greece 4.6;
and Italy 4.9.
3 Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (HDZ).
4 According to Divjak (2010) these ranged from non-transparent military procure-
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The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) ruled Greece from 1981 to 2004,
with a spell in opposition from 1990 to 1993.5 The extensive rent taking activi-
ties of PASOK under Andreas Papandreo was well known to the public (Dobratz
& Whiteld 1992). Yet PASOK survived numerous elections. In the 2004 elec-
tions Karamalis and "New Democracy" won the premiership on an anti-corruption
campaign. Karamaliss mandate was renewed in the 2007 election, despite cabinet
members from "New Democracy" being involved in several serious and publicized
corruption scandals preceding his reelection (Stratos & Karyotos 2007).6 In the
2009 election PASOK, running on an anti-corruption platform, reclaimed the Greek
premiership (now with Andreas Papandreosson George at the helm).7 Greece
appears to be short of clean candidates.
Erik Chang et al. (2008) nd that the reelection rate of Italian legislators in
the postwar period was 51% for legislators charged with corruption, compared to
58% for legislators running without such charges. This startling nding seems hard
to reconcile with explanations of electoral agency stressing informational asymme-
tries. Explanations in terms of ideological polarization are weakened by the fact
ment; bribes in the privatization of food chains ("Podravka") and banking ("Hypo"),
as well as kickbacks in infrastructure contracts ("HAC"). The most publicized (from
2006 onwards) incident was the so called "wrist watch scandal", in which Sanander
was found in breach of the rules of transparency by failing to register his collection
of wristwatches (estimated worth $200,000) prior to the 2003 election.
5 Panellinio Sosialistikó Kínima (PASOK).
6 According to Polychroniou 2008: "Bond trading scandals in which state pension
funds overpaid millions of euros for state bonds, a sleazy sweep up of the Vodafone
case (Vodafone was embroiled in phone tapping scandals involving leading business
and political members of the Greek establishment), dubious business dealings by a
host of ministers and deputies which led in the end to their downfall, last summers
forest res catastrophe and the subsequent parceling out of burned forest land to pri-
vate interests have pretty much characterized the political style of New Democracy
during its tenure in power."
7 Bågenholm (2009:13) documents that all Greek parties in all Greek election cam-
paigns from 1983 to 2007 had anti-corruption statements in their party manifesto.
In this perspective neither the PASOK campaign of 2009, nor the "New Democray"
campaign of 2004, were perhapes surprising.
4
that Italy is among the ideologically most homogenous democracies in the world.
Furthermore, the di¤erences demonstrated by Chang et al. (2008) are insigni-
cant for legislative assemblies except the one that took o¢ ce during the system
collapse in 1993-94. Thus, an unwillingness to throw out corrupt incumbents does
not seem to be driven by the (presumably) deeper ideological cleavages in early
postwar Italy.
Why are corrupt rulers, such as the ones above, not ousted in elections? Why
do people knowingly accept that their leaders abuse power for personal gain? Ex-
isting electoral agency models cannot account for the survival of such incumbents
in ideologically homogenous electorates, when it is common knowledge that the
incumbents are in fact rent-takers, enriching themselves at the publics expense.
We ll this gap in the literature. In our model corrupt incumbents may survive
a series of elections in equilibrium. This happens in spite of it being common
knowledge that the incumbent is in fact a rent-taker, and in absence of ideological
divides in the electorate.
2 Model
We start by analyzing a world in which incumbents are constitutionally barred
from serving more than a xed number of terms; i.e., a world with "term limits".
Thereafter we analyze a world without term limits.
Consider an electorate of size n. Citizens are identical in all relevant aspects.8
In particular they have identical incomes and face an identical (and given) income
tax rate. Rulers allocate tax income Z between a publicly provided good and
rents. If the total tax income is allocated to the publicly provided good, each
citizen receives z = Z
n
units worth of consumption from this provision. Rents are
extracted from total tax income. Let R denote rent extraction, and let r = R
n
.
A voters consumption of the publicly provided good in period t equals (z   rt),
8 This assumption is, of course, very strong, and signicantly reduces the need for
coordination among voters. It is nonetheless defensible, given our aim, which is to
analyze agency problems in the absence of ideological diversions in the electorate.
5
t 2 [0; T ]. T is allowed to be either xed or indenite. To simplify (without
loss of generality) maximal periodic rent-extraction equals Z.9 A voters periodic
utility is assumed to increase linearly in the quantity of the publicly provided good
(z   rt).
The electorate n consists of a fraction 0    1 good citizens(G), and a
fraction (1  ) bad citizens(B). G-type incumbents never extract rents. B-type
incumbents maximize expected rents for the remainder of the game. Own type is
private knowledge. All players discount utility with a common factor 0   < 1.
We assume that the periodic utility of a G-type incumbent is increasing linearly
in Z, while the periodic utility of a B-type incumbent is increasing linearly in R.
For ease of exposition we rescale the periodic utility of incumbents by 1
n
.
The following rules are imposed: Period t incumbents take the allocation deci-
sion in t. The outcome of the allocation decision is observed (without any noise)
by all players at the start of period t+1. Based on this observation citizens decide
whether to keep or throw out the period t incumbent. If the period t incumbent
survives, he or she makes the allocation decision in period t + 1. If the period
t incumbent loses the election, the new incumbent is selected by a random draw
from among the n citizens. The newly elected incumbent takes the allocation de-
cision in t + 1. This goes for all t 2 [1; T ].10 The incumbent in t = 0 is randomly
drawn from the n citizens, and makes the allocation decision in t = 0. We assume
n to be very large. Thus the probability that the same citizen is drawn to serve
as incumbent twice is (approximately) zero.
2.1 Term limits
After any period in which the incumbent extracts any rents, the only subgame
perfect equilibrium behavior of the voter is to oust the incumbent immediately, if
there are term limits. This follows from backward induction. Once an incumbent
9 No additional insights are gained by capping maximal periodic rents at a positive
level below Z.
10 With T being nite in the term limit case, and innite in the case without term
limits.
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has extracted any rents, it is common knowledge that he is a B-type. For this
reason he will certainly extract maximal rents in the nal period. Knowing this
the voters will oust him in the penultimate period. But then the incumbent has
no reason not to extract maximal rents in the penultimate period. Clearly, this
logic carries over all the way back to the rst period. The conclusion is that the
only subgame perfect equilibrium behavior after any rents has been taken at any
stage of the game, is for the voter to throw out the incumbent immediately. Given
a discount factor  < 1, the optimal stage at which to extract rents is the rst
stage where the opportunity presents itself. Once a G-type incumbent is selected,
no rent is extracted and this incumbent is kept for the remainder of the game.
2.2 No term limits
There is no need to consider honest incumbents further. A G-type sets rt = 0 by
denition. In what follows we focus on two strategies (V1 and V2) for voters, and
two strategies (I1 and I2) for B-type incumbents.
V1 Reelect the incumbent in t + 1 i¤ rt  r, otherwise throw the incumbent out
("cut-point")
V2 Reelect the incumbent in t + 1 i¤ rt = 0, otherwise throw the incumbent out
("zero tolerance")
I1 Extract rt = r i¤no incumbent that extracted rs  rwas thrown out in period
s < t, otherwise extract rt = z ("trigger")
I2 Extract rt = z ("all out")
Consider the cut-point strategy V1. Assume that B-types use the trigger-
strategy I1. Notice that I1 uses the harshest possible threat; if a B-type behaves
according to the strategy but is nevertheless thrown out of o¢ ce, any B-type
incumbent will extract maximal rents (z) in any future period. A broken promise
from the voters is never forgiven (despite the fact that some incumbent other than
the current one su¤ered from the votersbreach of promise, and no matter how far
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back in time the breach happened). The substance of this assumption is discussed
below.
Can (I1; V1) be supported as a Nash equilibrium? The voter minimizes the
rent taking of a B-type incumbent by setting rso as to make a B-type indi¤erent
between extracting maximal rents now (z) and being defeated in the next election,
or taking as many rents as possible and still surviving. Maximal rent-taking under
the reelection constraint is r. The expected utility of a B-type playing I1 against
V1 is therefore
EUB(I1; V1) =
r
(1  ) (1)
The smallest r making I1 a best reply against V1 is given by z = r

(1 ) . This
can be expressed as an incentive constraint
r = (1  )z (2)
Can V1 be a best-reply against I1? In order to answer this, we need only
compare V1 to the "zero tolerance strategy" V2. Any strategy that threatens
throwing out the incumbent if he takes more than a critical share that is lower
than (1  )z achieves exactly the same as V2: B-types remain undisciplined, and
therefore take rt = z. Seen from the perspective of a rational voter, a strategy that
promises reelection for rent-taking r > (1  )z makes no sense (it transfers more
wealth than necessary in order to discipline the rent-taker). Thus the problem of
the voter is reduced to a choice between two possible strategies, V1 or V2.
The votersdiscounted expectation of playing V1 against I1 is (where the last
expression on the RHS uses the incentive constraint in 2):
EUV (I1; V1) =
z + (1  )(z   r)
1   =
z + (1  )z
1   (3)
The voters discounted expectation of using V2 against I1 is
EUV (I1; V2) =
z
1   + (1  )z +
(1  )z
(1  )(1  (1  )) (4)
Equation (4) is determined as follows. If a G-type is drawn in period t = 0, he
is kept from then on and the voter gets z
1  . This happens with probability . If a
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B-type is drawn in period t = 0 the voter gets (z  r) = z (by 2). This happens
with probability (1  ). After such an event, however, no future B-type restrains
his rent-taking, so the voter thereafter gets zero utility in each period until a G-
type is drawn (and kept for eternity). The expected discounted utility following the
draw of a B-type in period t = 0 is therefore
h
(1 )z
1  +
2(1 )2z
1  +
3(1 )3z
1  + :::
i
,
or (1 )z
1 

1 + (1  ) + 2(1  )2 + 3(1  )3 + :::, which reduces to the last
term on the right hand side of (4).
For V1 to be a best reply against I1 we need EUV (I1; V1)  EUV (I1; V2), which
amounts to the requirement that z+(1 )z
1   z1 +(1 )z+ (1 )z(1 )(1 (1 )) . After
rearranging we nd that V1 is a best-reply to I1 i¤

1 + 
  (5)
The condition in (5) is the condition for (V1; I1) to be a Nash equilibrium of
the game.
The next question is whether this Nash equilibrium can be subgame perfect.
Start by considering a single deviation by a B-type incumbent from the equilibrium
path. The deviation nets the B-type incumbent a payo¤equal to z in the period in
which it is conducted, followed by a payo¤ of zero in all future periods. Deterrence
is guaranteed by the incentive constraint in (2).
Consider now a single deviation by a B-type incumbent from the punishment
path. Such a deviation must take the form rt = r in the period in which the
deviation takes place. After this the B-type incumbent returns to I1 and chooses
rt = z in all future periods. A single deviation from the punishment path is
unprotable if z  r + z. Substituting the incentive constraint (2) into this
expression, we appreciate that a B-type incumbent can never prot from a single
deviation from the punishment path.
What remains to be shown is that the voter likewise can never prot from
single deviations from the (I1; V1) equilibrium. Consider rst a deviation from the
equilibrium path. The relevant deviation consists of not reelecting a B-type that
extracted rt = r, and subsequently returning to V1 in t+ 1. In the deviation pe-
riod, the voters payo¤ is no di¤erent from his payo¤ had he followed the dictates
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of strategy V1(which instructs the voter to reelect). However, the single deviation
produces an instance of a B-type being dumped despite showing su¢ cient mod-
eration in his rent extraction. By assumption, no future B-types will constrain
their rent extraction in such a history. After the deviation from the equilibrium
path, therefore, the voters expectation is zero until he happens to draw a G-type,
who is kept and provides him with z from then on. Formally (and paralleling the
derivation of 4), the voters expectation after the single deviation can be expressed
as: z
1  [1+(1 )+2(1 )2+3(1 )3+:::], or more compactly as z(1 )(1 (1 )) .
It follows that a single deviation of this kind is unprotable if z
(1 )(1 (1 ))  z1  .
After rearranging, this inequality reduces to the Nash condition in (5).
What about a single deviation from the punishment path? Once punishments
are activated no B-type ever constrains his rent extraction (in accordance with
I1), and all B-types are dumped in elections (in accordance with V1). Thus, the
punishment path requires the voter to oust a B-type that extracted rt > r. The
relevant single deviation from the punishment path is to violate V1 by reelecting a
B-type that extracted z in rents in the present period. This is followed by a return
to the punishments described in V1 in the next period. It follows that the voters
single deviation gives him zero payo¤ in the deviation period. In the next period
(in which the B-type continues to extract maximal rents) the voter returns to
ousting bad politicians. The voter gets a payo¤ of zero in this period as well. The
single deviation simply postpones the opportunity of installing a G-type politician.
The deviation is unprotable if z
(1 )(1 (1 ))  z(1 )(1 (1 )) , which is true by the
assumption that  < 1.
Summing up, (I1; V1) is a subgame perfect equilibrium if 1+  . Thus, if
(I1; V1) is a Nash equilibrium, it is also subgame perfect. The left hand side of
this requirement equals 1
2
for  = 1, and zero for  = 0. Put into words, if the
fraction of honest candidates exceeds 1
2
, incentivizing rent-takers is impossible in
equilibrium. If the fraction of honest candidates is below 1
2
, rent takers can be
incentivized in equilibrium. Incentivizing, however, requires more patience () the
larger the fraction of honest candidates () is. These relations are depicted in
Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Existence of a rent taking equilibrium
What if we are outside of the range where rent-takers can be disciplined? Notice
rst that (I2; V2) is a Nash equilibrium. Provided the voter always sets r = 0 a
B-type incumbent can do no better than taking rt = z. And conversely, provided
that a B-type takes exactly rt = z, the voter can do no better than setting r = 0.
But is this equilibrium subgame perfect? The answer is "yes, for all parameter
values  and ". This is easily seen by recapitulating the denition of a subgame
perfect equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is Nash in every subgame. In the game
under consideration, each new period constitutes a subgame. There are two kinds
of subgame. One kind is where the voter got z in the preceding period, and
another kind in which the voter got zero in the preceding period. In the rst kind
of subgame, it is a best reply to re-elect; in the last kind of subgame it is a best
reply not to re-elect. The voter responds optimally to the incumbentsobserved
actions and given the voter response, the incumbentsactions are also optimal.
Accordingly, (I2; V2) is Nash in every subgame, and therefore subgame perfect.
We now show that (I1; V1) is Pareto-preferred to (I2; V2). In the rst of these
equilibria voter expectation equals z+(1 )z
1  . In the second equilibrium voter
expectation equals z
(1 )(1 (1 )) . The rst expression is larger than the latter
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expression if  < 1, which is true by assumption. What about aB-type incumbent?
The incentive constraint guarantees that a B-type incumbent is indi¤erent between
the two equilibria, so (I1; V1) is Pareto-preferred to (I2; V2).
Notice that even though the discipline-equilibrium Pareto-dominates the no-
discipline-equilibrium, discipline is credible only for certain combinations of pa-
rameters (the dark grey area of Figure 1). The upshot is that B-types cannot
be incentivized credibly in a range of situations in which voters would prot from
discipline, while B-types would not lose from discipline (the remaining area of Fig-
ure 1). In situations where incentives are credible, two equilibria coexist: (I1; V1)
(with discipline of B-types), and (I2; V2) (without discipline of B-types).
Players face an equilibrium selection problem. Theory does not provide un-
ambiguous suggestions in such cases (Harsanyi & Selten 1988; Samuelson 1997).
In isolation, however, the fact that the (I1; V1) equilibrium Pareto-dominates the
(I2; V2) equilibrium favors the former equilibrium, in which rent-takers are disci-
plined.11 It is worth noting that the coordination problem voters face when the two
equilibria coexist is signicantly reduced by the fact that voters are homogenous,
and that only a majority is required to pick an equilibrium.
3 Conclusion
In our model discipline is induced by a strategy in which dishonest incumbents
extract maximal rents in all future periods, once voters have committed a single
breach of the (implicit) promise to reelect if rent extraction is kept below a certain
treshold (rt  r). This is a very harsh threat indeed. However, the threat can be
scaled down in a number of ways.12 The consequence of scaling down the threat
11 It can be shown that both of the equilibria discussed are renegotiation proof (proof
available on request), so this particular renement does not provide guidance in our
model. We place limited weight on this renement anyhow. The concept assumes
a kind of collective rationality that is problematic, and produces (very) counter
intuitive predictions in important classes of games (Barrett 1999 with references).
12 We mention three. Firstly, rent-takers may extract maximal rents (rt= z) for k
periods after the voters promise has been broken, and then return to moderate
12
is the same irrespective of how we do it; the set of subgame perfect equilibria
that support disciplining of rent-takers will shrink, and, for a mild enough threat,
disciplining rent-takers will not be possible anymore.
Our model shows that persistent rent extraction might be an equilibrium out-
come, even in a full information environment in which there is no ideological het-
erogeneity. This is new to the literature on electoral agency. Rent-takers survive in
our model if the fraction of honest incumbents is su¢ ciently small and patience is
great enough. In equilibrium voters accept limited periodic rent extraction, rather
than provoking a (potentially long) string of incumbents that extracts maximal
rents, (eventually) followed by no rent extraction for eternity. We believe such
survival to be a real world phenomenon.
Acknowledgements: Constructive comments from two anonymous referees and
from Tom-Reiel Heggedal are greately appreciated.
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